

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 ANKARA 03740 01 OF 02 170530Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10
L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 ICA-11
HA-05 ACDA-12 IO-13 NEA-11 EB-08 TRSE-00 /115 W
-----123553 170541Z /20

R 161330Z MAY 78
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1953
INFO AMCONSUL ADANA
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
AMCONSUL IZMIR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 ANKARA 3740

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PEPR, TU, US
SUBJ: POLITICAL OFFICERS' SYMPOSIUM ON PROSPECTS FOR US-
TURKISH RELATIONS.

REF: ANKARA 3062

1. AT THE SPRING 1978 POLITICAL OFFICERS CONFERENCE MAY 3-4,
A SYMPOSIUM WAS HELD ON "PROSPECTS FOR US-TURKISH RELATIONS,
MAY-DECEMBER 1978". PARTICIPANTS (MOSTLY BUT NOT ALL
POLITICAL OFFICERS) INCLUDED SEVEN OFFICERS FROM CONSTITUENT
POSTS AND NINE FROM ANKARA. WE ARE REPORTING THE VIEWS
EXPRESSED--WHICH ARE INDIVIDUALS' OPINIONS, NOT AN EMBASSY
POSITION--BOTH FOR WHATEVER MERIT THEY HAVE AND AS AN
INDICATION OF THE DIVURSIY OF OPINION AMONG OBSERVERS
HERE.

2. THE DISCUSSION WAS ORGANIZED AROUND FIVE MAJOR
QUESTIONS: "WHAT'S IN IT FOR US? WHERE DOES ECEVIT
WANT TO TAKE TURKEY? ARE WE BEING BLACKMAILED OR BLUFFED?
WHAT HAPPENS IF CONGRESS REPEALS THE EMBARGO? WHAT
HAPPENS IF IT DOES NOT?" THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 ANKARA 03740 01 OF 02 170530Z

SKETCHES THE MAIN POINTS BROUGHT OUT IN RESPONSE TO
EACH MAJOR QUESTION:

A. "WHAT'S IN IT FOR US?" ASKED TO IDENTIFY
US NATIONAL INTERESTS IN TURKEY, THE GROUP LISTED THEM
AS:

-- A DEMOCRATIC, WESTERN-ORIENTED TURKEY;

--TURKEY'S PARTICIPATION IN NATO;

--MAINTENANCE OF PEACE IN THE REGION,
SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND DENIAL OF SOVIET STRATEGIC
USE OF TURKISH TERRITORY;

--ACCESS TO BASES.

SEVERAL OFFICERS INDICATED THEY BELIEVE DEMOCRACY
IS WELL-ROOTED HERE AND WILL CONTINUE DESPITE THE VICIS-
SITUDES OF US-TURKISH RELATIONS. OTHERS THOUGHT,
HOWEVER, THAT A TURNING AWAY FROM THE WEST COULD
EVENTUALLY LEAD TO A WEAKENING AND PERHAPS A BREAKDOWN OF
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS. IT WAS NOTED THAT MANY TURKS,
AND ESPECIALLY THE MILITARY, BELIEVE US INTERESTS ARE
MANIFESTED THROUGH OUR MILITARY RELATIONSHIP.

ONE OFFICER INDICATED SURPRISE THAT THERE DOES
NOT SEEM TO BE AN APPRECIATION AMONG US CONGRESSMEN
WHO SUPPORT ISRAEL OF TURKEY'S POSITION AS A BUFFER AGAINST
SOVIET INTENTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

IN CONCLUSION, ONE OFFICER POINTED OUT THAT
WHEREAS SEVERAL YEARS AGO ACCESS TO MILITARY INSTALLATIONS
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 ANKARA 03740 01 OF 02 170530Z

WOULD HAVE HEADED A LIST OF US INTERESTS IN TURKEY, THIS
SUBJECT WAS BURELY TOUCHED ON BY THE PARTICIPANTS--
INDICATING A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN ATTITUDES.

B. "WHERE DOES ECEVIT WANT TO TAKE TURKEY?"

THE GROUP CONCLUDED THAT IT IS STILL TOO EARLY
TO DETERMINE EXACTLY WHERE ECEVIT IS HEADING. THE SHOTGUN
APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY HE HAS PURSUED SO FAR, HOWEVER,
MAKES IT CLEAR ECEVIT WANTS TO HAVE ALL POSSIBLE OPTIONS
OPEN. ONE OFFICER EXPRESSED THE FEELING THAT AS AN INTEL-
LECTUAL, ECEVIT MUST HAVE SET GOALS. AMONG THESE MAY
BE A SINCERE DESIRE TO SOLVE PROBLEMS WITH GREECE AND
CYPRUS. AT THE SAME TIME, ECEVIT WANTS TO PROMOTE HIS
IMAGE AS THE DECISIVE LEADER OF AN INDEPENDENT, SELF-
RESPECTING TURKEY. IT WAS AGREED THAT ECEVIT ALSO
HOPES TO USE FOREIGN POLICY "VICTORIES/ TO BOLSTER HIS
IMAGE IF DOMESTIC PROBLEMS PROVE INTRACTABLE, AND TO
SOLVE OR AT LEAST GAIN TIME FOR HANDLING OTHER PROBLEMS,
SUCH AS THE ECONOMY.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 ANKARA 03740 02 OF 02 170706Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10
L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 ICA-11
HA-05 ACDA-12 IO-13 NEA-11 EB-08 TRSE-00 /115 W
-----124467 170714Z /12

R 161330Z MAY 78
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1954
INFO AMCONSUL ADANA
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
AMCONSUL IZMIR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 ANKARA 3740

THE VIEW WAS EXPRESSED THAT ECEVIT MAY BE
SEEKING A THRID WORLD LEADERSHIP ROLE WITH TURKEY AS
HIS PLATFORM. BY CONTRAST, OTHERS FELT ECEVIT WAS
PUTTING PRESSURE ON THE US AND NATO TO MAKE CLEAR
THEIR INTENTIONS TOWARDS TURKEY AND LIVE UP TO THEIR
COMMITMENTS.

C. "ARE WE BEING BLACKMAILED OR BLUFFED?"

AFTER AGREEING THAT THE GOT HAS USED BLUFFING
TACTICS IN THE PAST (VIZ., CYPRUS IN 1964), THE
CONSENSUS WAS THAT ECEVIT IS NOT TRYING TO BLACKMAIL OR
BLUFF US. ON THE CONTRARY, THE OFFICERS CONCLUDED THERE
IS A REAL THREAT THAT THE BREAKING POINT IN TURKISH TOLER-
ANCE MAY BE CLOSE. THE TURKS' PRIDE HAS BEEN HURT,
AND EVEN DEMIREL CAUTIOUSLY SOUGHT ALTERNATIVES TO
DEPENDENCE ON THE US. MOREOVER, THE TURKS SEEM TO
HAVE AN EXAGGERATED AND UNFLAGGING SENSE OF THE VALUE WE
PLACE ON THE INTELLIGENCE FACILITIES IN THIS COUNTRY.

D. "WHAT HAPPENS IF THE CONGRESS REPELAS THE EMBARGO?"

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 ANKARA 03740 02 OF 02 170706Z

THE TURKISH MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IS VERY

LIKELY TO PRESENT A LONG 'SHOPPING LIST' FOR WHICH WE MAY BE UNWILLING OR UNABLE TO PAY. IT IS NOT YET CERTAIN TO WHAT DEGREE WE CAN EXPECT ACCESS TO FACILITIES OR UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES.

WE MAY FACE THE NEED TO DEAL WITH THE GREEK SIDE' PIQUE AND TO CONVINCE THEM THAT WE MUST NEGOTIATE IF A CYPRUS SOLUTION IS TO BE FOUND. WE MAY ALSO FIND THAT THE TURKS MUST BE PRODDED MORE TOWARD A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT.

IF THE EMBARGO IS LIFTED, THE US WILL NEED TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE CREATION OF TURKISH CONFIDENCE. AT THE SAME TIME, WE ARE LIKELY TO BE ASKED TO DELIVER ECONOMIC HELP, TO PROVE OUR SINCERITY, AND TO MAKE AN INVESTMENT IN TURKEY'S FUTURE WITH NO GUARANTEE OF A TANGIBLE RETURN.

WITH THE EMBARGO REPEALED THERE IS POTENTIAL FOR DEVELOPING OUR RELATIONS AND PROTECTING OUR INTERESTS, BUT WE FACE A ROUGH ROAD, THE GROUP CONCLUDED.

3. "WHAT HAPPENS IF IT DOES NOT?"

TURKEY UNDER RECEIPT HAS MADE CLEAR ITS EXPECTATION THAT THE US AND OTHER WESTERN ALLIES SHOULD PROVE THEIR COMMITMENT TO TURKEY. IF THE EMBARGO IS NOT LIFTED, THIS WILL BE TAKEN AS A SIGN THAT THE US DOES NOT INTEND TO RESPOND. THE MAIN EFFECT WILL BE PSYCHOLOGICAL. AMONG SPECIFIC EFFECTS FORECAST BY PARTICIPANTS:

--THE TURKS MAY REQUIRE WITHDRAWAL OF THE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 ANKARA 03740 02 OF 02 170706Z

MOST VISIBLE SYMBOLS OF OUR PRESENCE, SUCH AS TUSLOG, JUSMMAT, AND NON-NATO FACILITIES.

--TURKEY MAY INTENSIFY THE SEARCH FOR AN ALTERNATIVE TO NATO, ALTHOUGH THE GROUP AGREED THAT A WITHDRAWAL OR MAJOR CHANGE PROBABLY WOULD NOT TAKE PLACE BEFORE A VIABLE OPTION HAS BEEN FIRMLY ESTABLISHED.

--THE PACE OF CHANGE IN ATTITUDES AMONG OFFICERS OF THE ARMED FORCES MAY ACCELERATE, AND EVEN CONSERVATIVES IN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN LIFE MAY CONCLUDE TURKEY HAS BEEN PUSHED INTO AN ALTERNATIVE IT DOES NOT WANT BUT MUST ACCEPT.

--CYPRUS AND OTHER GREEK-TURKISH DISPUTES WILL BE MADE HARDER TO SOLVE.

CONCERNING THE POSSIBLE DOMESTIC POLITICAL
IMPACT OF THE CONTINUATION OF THE EMBARGO, SOME PARTICIPANTS
OBSERVED THAT ECEVIT MAY ATTEMPT TO USE THE EMBARGO AS
A SCAPEGOAT FOR OTHER FAILURES AND DEFLECT ATTENTION FROM
PRESSING PROBLEMS. THSE WHO BELIEVE ECEVIT MAY INTEND
TO PUSH TURKEY TO THE LEFT SAID AN EMBARGO DEFEAT MAY
BE EXACTLY THE KIND OF JUSTIFICATION ECEVIT WANTS. BY
CONTRAST, OTHERS SAID THAT THE FAILURE OF ECEVIT'S EFFORT
TO GET THE EMBARGO LIFTED, COMBINED WITH CONTINUING INTERNAL
PROBLEMS, COULD BE POLITICALLY VERY DAMAGING TO HIM.
ONE OFFICER WARNED THAT ECEVIT COULD FEEL IMPELLED TO
'ACCEPT' SLIPPAGE FROM TURKEY'S DEMOCRATIC COMMITMENT.

OVERALL, PARTICIPANTS WERE APPREHENSIVE THAT
A FAILURE TO REPEAL THE EMBARGO WOULD PLACE ALL US INTERESTS
IN TURKEY AT RISK, WITH THE DEGREE OF RISK VARYING ACCORD-
INGO TO THE OBJECTIVE.
SPIERS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN RELATIONS, ARMS EMBARGO
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 16 may 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978ANKARA03740
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780207-0421
Format: TEL
From: ANKARA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780556/aaaabvjm.tel
Line Count: 242
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: ab5cc19c-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 78 ANKARA 3062
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 09 jun 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2683931
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: POLITICAL OFFICERS' SYMPOSIUM ON PROSPECTS FOR US- TURKISH RELATIONS.
TAGS: PEPR, TU, US
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/ab5cc19c-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014